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Abstract
Little is known about how people learn to take into account others’ opinions in joint decisions. To address this question, we
combined computational and empirical approaches. Human dyads made individual and joint visual perceptual decision and
rated their confidence in those decisions (data previously published). We trained a reinforcement (temporal difference)
learning agent to get the participants’ confidence level and learn to arrive at a dyadic decision by finding the policy that
either maximized the accuracy of the model decisions or maximally conformed to the empirical dyadic decisions. When
confidences were shared visually without verbal interaction, RL agents successfully captured social learning. When
participants exchanged confidences visually and interacted verbally, no collective benefit was achieved and the model failed
to predict the dyadic behaviour. Behaviourally, dyad members’ confidence increased progressively and verbal interaction
accelerated this escalation. The success of the model in drawing collective benefit from dyad members was inversely related
to confidence escalation rate. The findings show an automated learning agent can, in principle, combine individual opinions
and achieve collective benefit but the same agent cannot discount the escalation suggesting that one cognitive component
of collective decision making in human may involve discounting of overconfidence arising from interactions.
Citation: Mahmoodi A, Bang D, Ahmadabadi MN, Bahrami B (2013) Learning to Make Collective Decisions: The Impact of Confidence Escalation. PLoS ONE 8(12):
e81195. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081195
Editor: Stephen C. Pratt, Arizona State University, United States of America
Received June 25, 2013; Accepted October 10, 2013; Published December 6, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Mahmoodi et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: AM and MNA are funded by UT and IPM. BB was supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from the British Academy and European Research Council
(Grant number: 309865). This work was supported by a StG grant from European Research Council to BB. The funders had no role in study design, data collection
and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: ali.mahmoodi1367@gmail.com
Introduction
The exchange of information between members of a group has
been crucial to the success of the human species [1], [2]. However,
surprisingly little is known about how we learn to integrate each
other’s opinions when making decisions as part of a group [3]. To
make effective group decisions, we must continuously evaluate the
reliability of each other’s opinions and, perhaps more importantly,
share and calibrate these subjective estimates in order to decide
whose opinion is more likely to benefit the group. This task is
complicated by the fact that the very process of social interaction
may bias the information upon which our individual opinions are
based [4–6].
Collective decisions e.g. jury verdicts, medical diagnosis or
financial investment, are often characterized by uncertain choice
between known alternatives. Uncertainty-ridden collective deci-
sion making has been subject to theoretical [7–9] and more
recently, empirical examination [10–12]. A much more extensive
body of work in social psychology of collective decision making has
focused on knowledge refinement: opinion sharing and social
influence have been studied in the context of knowledge of
numerical facts (e.g. historical milestones, ‘‘In what year did the second
world war start?’’; descriptive statistics on demographics, ‘‘what
proportion of population in Framingham, MA are under 15 years old?’’;
predicting the outcome of future sporting events) [13], [14].
However, both of these previous lines of work have generally
assumed stationarity for social decision making by (often explicitly)
positing that the reliability of individual opinions and the strategy
for combining them stay constant over time.
Recently, a number of learning models have been proposed for
social learning in non-cooperative contexts. Hampton and
colleagues used reinforcement learning (RL) to examine how we
infer the hidden intentions of those working against us [15], [16]
used RL to describe how we integrate social advice with subjective
information [16]. Behrens and colleagues [17] developed a
Bayesian model to explain how we discount social advice based
on an advisor’s history of trustworthiness. In the artificial
intelligence domain, Mirian and colleagues developed a continu-
ous Bayesian RL model to learn fusion of experts’ probabilistic
decisions [18]. However, the primary focus of these studies was on
game-theoretic approaches; consequently, for these models conflict
of interest and inference of hidden intentions are the primary
computational/cognitive hurdles. This is a different domain from
the case of uncertainty-ridden social collective decision making
where communication and integration information about uncer-
tainty is the primary computational task. In summary, despite their
intuitive appeal, theoretical and empirical examinations of
dynamic aspects achieving a benefit from cooperation are scarce.
A demonstration of social learning in the context of collective
decision making was recently reported [19]. Dyad members
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Figure 1. (A) Stimulus, experimental procedure and modes of communication. In each trial participants observed two consecutive stimulus
intervals and then announced their private decisions about which interval contained the oddball (here illustrated by the dotted outline). Participants
reported their confidence in private. Individual decisions were then announced, and in cases of disagreement participants saw each other’s
confidence rating (in both conditions) and also talked to each other (only in V/V condition) in order to reach a joint decision. Feedback was provided
at the end of each trial (B). The average psychometric function plots the proportion of trials in which the 2nd interval was chosen against the contrast
difference between oddball and distractors. A highly sensitive observer would produce a steeply rising psychometric function with a large slope.
Circles, performance of the less sensitive observer (Smin) of the dyad; grey squares, performance of the more sensitive observer (Smax); and black
squares, performance of the dyad (Sdyad ). (C) Distribution of confidence levels in the Visual and Visual/Verbal conditions. Error bars are 1 SE.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081195.g001
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participated in a visual perceptual experiment in which they
estimated their confidence in their individual decisions about a
visual stimulus on every trial, but were also required to make joint
decisions whenever their individual decisions conflicted. The
results indicated that dyadic performance changed over time.
Dyads did not initially exceed their better member. But with time,
groups accumulated a robust collective benefit. Critically, the
results showed that dyad members’ communicated confidence
ratings changed relative to each other over time. Such a demonstration
of dynamic changes in social collective decision making mean that
previous simpler models that assumed stationary dynamics [10],
[11] must be complemented by more sophisticated models that
could take into account such dynamics. To address this problem,
we developed a model for social learning in collective decision
making based on the principles of reinforcement learning [20],
[21].
In addition, we used this modelling exercise to address another
question raised earlier. Bahrami and colleagues in [19] showed
that dyad members who first made an individual decision and then
verbally discussed a joint decision outperformed dyad members
who were also asked to explicitly rate their confidence in their
individual decision Thus, explicit introspection and verbal
communication interacted sub-additively in contributing to collective
decision making. Interestingly, dyads who communicated only via
explicit introspection (without verbal communication), did not do
any better. As such, the question how engaging in different modes
of expressing one’s confidence may interfere with one another
remains open. We asked if combining verbal and visual confidence
sharing affects the dynamical aspects of learning in social collective
decision making. We used the empirical data from a previous
study [19] to compare the success of our RL-based model in
explaining dyadic behaviour and to identify the possible psycho-
logical mechanism that might have led to differences in collective
benefit for various modes of communication.
Methods
The Experiment
The local ethics committee (The Interacting Mind Ethics
Committee at Aarhus University) approved all experiments, and
written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The
stimuli parameters and the procedure have been described in
detail elsewhere [19]. In brief, 58 healthy male adult participants
(mean age 6 std: 23.562.5) were paired into 29 dyads and
participated in one of two conditions (14 dyads in a Visual
condition and 15 dyads in a Verbal/Visual condition – see below).
Members of each dyad knew each other beforehand. Each
participant was only recruited for one of the two conditions.
In each trial, the dyad members first made an individual
decision about a briefly presented visual stimulus (i.e. whether a
target occurred in a first or second viewing interval) and indicated
their confidence in this decision on a scale with 5 steps (Figure 1A).
The individual responses (i.e. decision and confidence) were then
publicly displayed for both dyad members. In the case of
disagreement (i.e. the dyad members independently selected
different intervals), the dyad members were required to make a
joint decision. In the verbal/visual (V/V) condition, the dyad
members had access to each other’s responses (i.e. decision and
confidence) and were also allowed to talk to each other about what
might be the right decision. In the visual (V) condition, the dyad
members only had access to each other’s responses. In both
conditions, for each disagreement trial, one of the two dyad
members was randomly nominated to indicate the joint decision.
On each trial, visual target’s contrast was randomly chosen from 4
values, spanning very easy (high contrast) to very difficult (low
contrast) decisions. Each dyad completed 16 blocks of 16 trials,
giving rise to 256 trials in total.
Estimating the Individual and Collective Performance
For each decision maker (i.e. individuals and the dyad as a
whole), a psychometric function was constructed by calculating the
proportion of trials in which the target was reported seen in the
second interval against the target contrast (i.e. Dc, the target
contrast in the second interval minus the target contrast in the first
– see Figure 1B). The resulting curves were fit to a cumulative
Gaussian function with parameters bias, b, and variance, s2 using
a probit regression model (glmfit function in Matlab, Math works
Inc). A decision maker with bias b and variance s2 would have a
psychometric function P(Dc) where Dc is the target contrast
difference, given by
P(Dc)~H
Dczb
s
 
, ð1Þ
Where H(z) is the cumulative Normal function,
H(z):
ðz
{?
dt
2pð Þ1=2
exp {t2=2
 
: ð2Þ
Given the above definitions for P(Dc), we see that the decision
variance is related to the maximum slope of the fitted psycho-
metric curve at its point of inflection, denote s, via
s~
1
2ps2ð Þ1=2
: ð3Þ
A steeply rising curve has a large slope, indicating small
variance and thus high sensitivity to the target contrast. We used
this measure to quantify the individuals’ and the dyad’s sensitivity.
We defined collective benefit as the ratio of the dyad’s slope (sdyad) to
that of the more sensitive dyad member (i.e. the dyad member
with the steeper slope, smax); a value above 1 indicated that the
dyad managed to obtain a benefit over and above its better
observer.
Modelling
We used reinforcement learning (RL) to construct a dynamic
model of the dyadic choice behaviour. An RL agent searches for a
behavioural policy that maximizes its expected reward. The RL
agent solves this problem by estimating the expected reward –
called value–of the possible actions for each state that the agent may
encounter in its environment [20], [21]. In our case, each state(s) is
identified by the pair of confidences (c1 and c2) reported by the
dyad members in each trial. The action (a) is the joint decision (1st
or 2nd interval) adopted by the dyad. The reward (Rt) in trial t is
+1 if the decision turns out to be correct and 21 otherwise. The
behaviour policy adopted by the RL agent is the probability
distribution that the agent assigns its two possible actions for each
state. We used a single-step version of the Temporal Difference
(TD) learning algorithm (Sutton, 1998). In this algorithm, trial-by-
trial, the agent updates the value of the action-state pair (s,a)
pertaining to that trial:
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Qtz1(s,a)~Qt(s,a)zadt ð4Þ
where 0#a#1 is free learning rate parameter and
dt~Rt{Qt(s,a) is the prediction error.
Reduction of the State Space
In both conditions, (see above and Figure 1A) the individual
confidence estimates took integer values from 25 (high confidence
for first interval) to +5 (high confidence for second interval)
excluding zero. Therefore, the two dimensional 10610 state space
s~(c1,c2) had100 possible combinations. This number of states was
too large for the learning algorithm to handle and converge
meaningfully considering that the total number of trials was 256.
Moreover, we observed that participants’ used the higher
confidence (4 & 5) levels much less frequently (see Figure 1 C).
Therefore, we transformed the state space by collapsing the two
highest levels of confidence (i.e. 2/+4 and 2/+5 were relabelled
as 2/+4). Given our models’ preference for smaller state-spaces,
one may wonder whether empirical interpersonal communication
might have been more successful if a sparser confidence space (e.g.
with 3 rather 5 levels) was offered to the participants. Unfortu-
nately, the behavioural results described here cannot tell us much
about the human observers’ preferred resolution of confidence
space. Future research in collective decision making could address
such possible role of resolution of information. To ensure the
generality of our findings, we also tried a number of similar
transformations of the state space and our results were qualita-
tively replicated.
Max Accuracy RL
For each dyad, we divided the experimental data into three time
bins and for each time bin. We observed that people’s confidence
reporting changes across time (see Escalation of Confidence).
Previously, it was shown [19] that the mutual relationship between
confidence ratings of dyad members changed across time.
Bahrami et al [19] calculated the alignment of confidence across
trials and found that the dynamics of the chance in this ratio was
only observable when the data were split into three or more bins
(See their Figure 8A in ref. [19]). One way to deal with such a non-
stationary confidence reporting is to tune the a parameter
(learning rate) every few trials. Instead, and to avoid model
complexity we divided the data into three equal bins and restarted
the learning process from the beginning in each bin. By doing so,
we could cope with the previously observed non-stationary nature
of confidence reporting. We also tried dividing the data into more
bins, but number of trials in each bin wouldn’t be sufficient for the
analysis. We tried modelling the entire time-series as one whole
session (i.e. without restarting the learning by using one bin) as
well. The model fitness to dyads’ slope was best with three bins.
Nevertheless, the main findings were the qualitatively same for
three and one bin analysis. We ran the learning algorithm with a
fixed learning rate, the free parameter (0#a#1) in eq. (4). Within
each bin, we searched for the learning rate that produced the
maximum slope (defined in eq. 3). Then we computed the RL
agent’s overall slope (see Table S1 for the pseudo code). Since we
wanted this slope to be comparable to dyadic performance
measures across the entire experiment, we collapsed the whole
data of the three bins and calculated the slope of the whole trials.
At the beginning of each run of learning algorithm for each subset,
we initialized the Q-values to zero. The Q-values were updated
using (eq. 4). In each trial the agent used a greedy policy for
decision making:
at~ argmaxa1,a2 (Qt s,a1ð Þ,Qt s,a2ð Þ) ð5Þ
Where a1(a2) corresponded to 1
st 2nd
 
interval respectively. In
the first occurrence of each state, where Q s,a1ð Þ~Q s,a2ð Þ~0, the
agent took the action that had higher confidence;
i.e.at~ interval argmaxci f cið Þj j,i~1,2ð Þð Þ where interval(l) is the
interval associated to the confidence level l and f(.) is the state
definition function; see Reduction of the state space.
Max Similarity RL
The accuracy maximizing RL treated each dyad as one
functional unit. One may argue, however that in our experiments,
even though every disagreement trial involves arbitration between
dyad members, the joint decision was eventually made by the dyad
member who was nominated to indicate the decision. As such,
each dyad may better be described as a combination of two
decision makers. In order to address this possibility, we fitted
separate RL models to the joint decisions indicated by each dyad
member, searching for the learning rate that most closely fitted the
individual dyad member’s choice behaviour when responded on
behalf of the dyad. All other model details were the same as those
of the accuracy-maximizing RL model.
Results
Max Accuracy RL
To compare the empirical dyadic decision with those of the RL
agents, we computed the collective benefit (CB) obtained by the
model (smodel/smax, Figure 2A, dark grey bars)and compared it to
empirical collective benefit obtained by the dyads (sdyad/smax,
Figure 2 A, black bars)for the V and V/V conditions. In the V
condition, the RL model successfully accrued a significant
collective benefit compared to the dyad’s best member’s sensitivity
(t(13) = 2.6; p,0.01; one sample t-test comparing logarithm mean
CB to 0). To avoid heavy tale distribution, we applied the
statistical tests on the log-transformed ratios. Furthermore, this
collective benefit obtained by the model was comparable to that
empirically achieved by the dyads. The upper left panel in Figure 2
B shows that the accuracy maximizing RL model did a good job of
case-by-case predicting the empirical dyadic slope in the Visual
condition. In the Visual/Verbal condition, however, the RL
model did not achieve any significant collective benefit
(t(14) =2.71; p.0.48; one sample t-test comparing logarithm
mean CB to 0). Moreover, the collective benefit accrued by the RL
model was significantly less than that achieved by the dyads
(paired t-test comparing logarithm CB for model and the dyads;
t(14) =23.74; p,0.003; Figure 2A and 2B upper right panel).
Finally, testing our main hypothesis directly revealed that the
concordance between the RL model and empirical data (smodel/
sdyad) was significantly higher in the V compared to V/V conditions
(independent sample t-test; t(27) = 2.3; p,0.04).
Max Similarity RL
Here we modelled the dyadic decision making process as the
combination of two parallel, concurrent reinforcement learning
processes, one for each dyad member. We wanted to see if
conceiving of the dyad as the aggregation of two separate decision
makers rather than a singular unit (as in above) would enhance the
RL model’s concordance with the empirical data. The aggregate
RL agent conferred larger collective benefit in the V compared to
V/V (independent t-test; t(27) = 2.1;p = 0.034). It was a also good
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predictor of dyadic performance in the V (paired t-test; t(13) = .24;
p = 0.8; Figure 2B, lower left panel) but not in the V/V (paired t-
test; t(14) =23.5; p = 0.0035; Figure 2B, lower right panel)
condition. In sum, these results did not show any qualitative
difference between the dyad as an aggregate (Max Similarity) and
dyad as a unit (Max Accuracy) modelling approaches. Therefore,
through the rest of the paper we only focus on the simpler Max
Accuracy RL model. However, caution must be exercised in direct
comparison of these two approaches since they employ quite
different details (e.g. number of free parameters).
The results suggested that availability of verbal communication
affected the learning strategy employed to arrive at dyadic
decisions. In the Visual condition, dyadic behaviour was consistent
with the simple RL strategy encapsulated by eq. 4 and 5.
However, in the Visual/Verbal condition, even though dyads
achieved a comparable level of collective benefits, their behaviour
Figure 2. Comparison of empirical and modelling outcomes. (A) Average collective benefit (CB, smodel/smax) is plotted for the empirical (black)
data as well as the RL models (light and dark grey). In the visual condition, the RL model successfully accrued a significant collective benefit compared
to the dyad’s best member’s sensitivity. Error bars are 1SE. (B) Scatter plots show the relation between model predictions and empirical data for Max
Accuracy (top row) and Max Similarity (bottom row): both modelling approaches did a good job of case-by-case predicting the empirical dyadic slope
in the Visual condition (left column). But in the Visual/Verbal condition (right column), the RL models were consistently inferior to empirical
performance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081195.g002
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was not consistent with the same RL strategy. What could the
impact of verbal communication on collective decision making be
that led to such divergent strategies in the V and V/V conditions?
One possibility is that direct, verbal interaction might have
affected how the individuals express their shared confidence. In an
elegant study, Shergill and colleagues [22] had participants engage
in a tit-for-tat game of exchanging forces where two participants
took turns at applying pressure (using their right index finger) to
each other’s left index finger. Importantly, both participants were
instructed to apply the same amount of pressure that their partner
had applied to them in the preceding turn. Surprisingly, the
applied force escalated rapidly even though instructions empha-
sized maintaining equality. Agents applied more and more force
upon each other. In a second experiment, Shergill and colleagues
[22] demonstrated that force escalation critically depends on direct
interaction. When participants applied forces via an intermediary
device – transforming a joy-stick movement to force –force
escalation was substantially reduced.
We conjectured that direct interaction might have a similar
effect on confidence judgements. Indeed, previous research
suggests that making a decision as part of a group leads to
increases in confidence that are not mirrored in accuracy [14].
Based on these findings, we hypothesised that direct interaction led
to an escalation of decision confidence that was not mirrored in
increased sensitivity (i.e. the slope of the psychometric function).
Moreover, similar to escalation of forces, one may expect the boost
in confidence to build up progressively over time. Finally, we
predicted that if the failure of the Max Accuracy RL models to
account for the collective decisions is due to confidence escalation,
then the collective benefit achieved by the RL algorithm should be
correlated with the speed of confidence escalation across dyads.
Escalation of Confidence
There was no difference in individual participants’ slope
between conditions (independent samples t-test; t(56) = 0.06,
p..94). However, mean absolute confidence expressed by
participants (averaged over all trials) was significantly higher in
the V/V compared to V condition (independent samples t-test;
t(56) =22.29, p,.03). These results corroborated the previous
findings (Heath and Gonzalez,1995) that verbal interaction leads
to increased confidence without improving accuracy.
To assess the build up of confidence over time, we again divided
the data into the 3 time bins devised and employed a 2 (V and V/
V conditions) by 3 (time bins) ANOVA. The main effects of
experimental condition and time were both significant (Figure 3 A;
for condition, F(1,56) = 4.85, p=0.03; for time F(2,112) = 26.71,
p,0.001; Figure 3 B). The interaction between condition and time
bin was nearly significant (F(,2,112) = 2.73, p=0.070) lending
support to the hypothesis that direct interaction accelerated the
escalation of confidences. Direct comparison between conditions
in each time bin showed no significant difference in confidence in
the first time bin (t(56) = 1.56, p.0.12; independent samples t-test),
a near-significant difference in confidence in the second time bin
(independent t-test; t(56) =21.89, p=0.06) and a significant
difference in confidence in the third time bin (independent t-test;
t(56) = 2.6,p,.02). A similar 2 by 3 ANOVA on individual
sensitivity showed no significant effects (p..05).
We then tested the hypothesized relationship between speed of
confidence escalation and failure of the RL model. Since this
prediction was independent of the mode of communication, we
tested the correlation after collapsing the data from the two
conditions. We first quantified the change in mean absolute
confidence from bin 1 to bin 3 for each individual by:
X2
i~1
DMiz1{Mi D
Where Mi is the average absolute confidence of a participant in
time bin i. Then for each dyad, we calculated the sum of this value
from the constituting individuals. A negative correlation (Pearson
r=2.405; p,.03; R2=210.66) was found between the dyadic
cumulative change in absolute confidence and the collective
benefit obtained by the Max Accuracy RL model for each dyad.
Discussion
We employed a reinforcement learning [20], [21] approach to
develop a model for social learning in collective decision making
via confidence sharing. We used the empirical data obtained from
human participants in a previous work and trained two simple RL
algorithms that, on a trial by trial basis, combined the participants’
expressed level of confidence to arrive at a dyadic decision.
Learning involved finding the appropriate policy for mapping
individual confidence pairs to dyad decisions that either
maximized the accuracy of the model or most closely conformed
to the dyadic decisions.
We found that both approaches were similarly successful at
explaining the empirical findings in the Visual condition where
dyad members shared their confidences through a graphical
interface without interacting verbally with one another. This result
helps us draw a clearer picture of how individuals combine their
own uncertainty-ridden decision with those expressed by others.
The simplicity of the learning algorithm, which essentially boils
down to equations 4 and 5 (see Methods), is of great value in
helping us form an idea about the mechanism of how the dyads
may have learned from previous rounds of interaction towards
arbitrating the current disagreement.
This finding also demonstrates that communication of intro-
spection by Visual means alone is rich enough to ensure collective
benefit even by an automated learning agent such as the RL
models employed here. This is consistent with a recent study [12]
which showed that pooling subjective confidences from multiple
non-communicating observers leads to collective benefit. Both [12]
and the current study focused on perceptual decisions, yet it is
difficult to compare the quantitative magnitude of collective
benefits delivered by each method. Applying the Maximum
Confidence Slating (MCS) algorithm [12] to our data is
problematic because in MCS, non-communicating observers are
handpicked post-hoc by the experimenter to form ‘‘virtual’’ dyads
according to the similarity of their individual performances. This is
not the case for the current work and individuals comprising a
dyad are fixed. Future research will be needed to clarify the
possible differences between automated social learning algorithms
(such as implemented here) and the post-hoc schemes that depend
on an experimenter’s direct influence.
In the Visual/Verbal condition, on the other hand, where
participants exchanged confidences visually and interacted verbal-
ly, the same RL models were unable to achieve any collective
benefit and significantly deviated from predicting the dyadic
behaviour. These diverging findings from the Visual versus
Visual/Verbal conditions can help us infer the direction of
interference between introspection and collective decision making.
Bahrami and colleagues [19] showed that dyads achieve more
collective benefit if they make their private decisions (Figure 1) with
verbal communication but without explicit confidence rating. That
finding suggested that introspection (i.e. explicit confidence rating)
Learning to Make Collective Decisions
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which is a cognitively demanding process [23], [24] may interfere
with verbally mediated collective decision making. An open
question was whether this interference is unidirectional or, rather,
verbal interaction could also interfere with the process of
introspection.
Meanwhile, previous works showed that verbal communication
alone is also adequate for ensuring collective benefit [11], [25].
Since verbally and visually communicated confidences are, by
definition, meant to convey the same information (i.e. the
subjective probability of accurate decision) substantial redundancy
must be shared between them. As such, the fact that the empirical
benefits of the two channels did not add up to additional collective
benefit in the Visual/Verbal condition (Figure 3A, compare black
bars) may simply be a trivial consequence of such redundancy
rather than any form of active interference.
The failure of the RL models in the Visual/Verbal condition
rejects the redundancy alternative and presents strong evidence for
the interference account. Some active form of interference between
the two channels of communication renders the visually conveyed
information much less informative about decision uncertainty: in
the Visual/Verbal condition, the same RL models (with identical
structural complexity and number of parameters to Visual
condition)did not achieve any collective benefit from utilizing the
visually shared confidence. Thus, our findings using computational
modelling go beyond earlier work [19], [24] by clearly demon-
strating the interfering impact of direct verbal interaction on the
process of introspection and explicit confidence rating.
Our subsequent follow-up behavioural analysis showed that as
participants went through the experiment, they grew progressively
more confident in their decisions; this boost in confidence was
much more pronounced with verbal communication (Figure 3A)
and was inversely correlated with success of the RL model applied
to confidence estimates (Figure 3B). These results help further
clarify the nature of the interference between introspection and
social interaction in the form of confidence escalation (Heath and
Gonzalez, 1995; Shergill et al 2003).
An interesting aspect of our behavioural findings is that the
collective benefit obtained by the dyads was not affected by the
greater confidence escalation under V/V (vs. V) condition
(Figure 2A, black bars). This raises the possibility that participants
in the V/V condition were simply ignoring the confidence ratings
and focused on the verbal communication. This account would
require that collective benefit in the V/V condition be as good as
when participants communicate exclusively verbally without any
explicit confidence rating. Bahrami et al in [19] showed that
collective benefit is significantly larger under verbal-only (versus
V/V) communication ruling out the possibility of ignoring the
confidence ratings in the V/V condition. Shergill et al in [22]
argued that human agents engaged in force escalation underes-
timate the force they apply to their partner because they implicitly
discount their own applied force. It is likely that here too, in V/V
condition agents have some implicit understanding of the
escalating nature of their shared confidences which may help
them discount the trend and achieve empirical collective benefits
comparable to that obtained in the Visual condition where
confidence escalation is much less pronounced. Such implicit
understanding of the underlying dynamics, however, is not
available to the RL model leading to its failure in the Visual/
Verbal condition. An important question for future research would
be whether agents are indeed aware of such trends or not and if
they could learn to minimize their interfering impact on
communication towards collective benefit.
Supporting Information
Table S1 Pseudocode for RL algorithm. (A) Maximum
accuracy and (B) maximum similarity. In maximum accuracy
(maximum similarity) for each dyad (individual) we first trans-
formed the confidence ratings (see Methods) and then ran the
Figure 3. Confidence escalation and its correlation with collective benefit. (A) Mean absolute decision confidence (across participants) is
plotted against time bins. Each time bin corresponds to one third of the trials. Black and grey lines refer to V and V/V conditions, respectively. Error
bars are 1 SE. (B) Collective benefit obtained by the best fitting accuracy-maximizing RL model is plotted against change of confidence across the 3
time bins.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0081195.g003
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learning algorithm with a fixed learning rate for each subset of the
experimental data. We searched for the learning rate that
maximized the slope (trial by trial similarity of model and
individual) over each three subsets of the trials; then for each trial,
we assigned decisions to dyads based on the winning learning rate
model and finally calculated the overall dyadic slope for each
dyad.
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